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A New Era of Disclosure: California
Judicial Council Enacts Arbitrator
Ethics Standards
Ethics Standards for Neutral Arbitrators in Contractual Arbitration'
I. INTRODUCTION
In deciding to arbitrate, parties supposedly make the conscious choice to
waive their right to public trial and due process of law2 in hopes of gaining a more
efficient, less expensive dispute resolution. Parties make this waiver without the
expectation that they are also waiving their rights to fairness or an impartial fact
finder. However, it is not uncommon for the losing party to sue to have the
arbitration award vacated based on claims that an arbitrator failed to disclose
relationships or interests pertaining to the arbitration or parties therein. Generally,
courts have been reluctant to vacate arbitration awards based on arbitrator bias.
3
The California legislature and judicial council have taken steps to stop
arbitrator bias before it starts. The state's legislature and judicial council directed
their light to shine upon potential partialities proposed neutral arbitrators may
have in arbitration proceedings.4 In its "Ethics Standards for Neutral Arbitrators
in Contractual Arbitration, 5 which became effective July 1, 2002,6 the California
Judicial Council ("CJC") 7 propounded new disclosure rules for neutral arbitrators
1. Ethics Standards for Neutral Arbitrators in Contractual Arbitration, Cal. R. Ct., app. 6 (2002).
2. This waiver operates to "waive all substantive law fights and most procedural fights." Richard
C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution and Public
Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. Rev. 949, 1018 (2000).
3. "[Tlhe mood is one of reluctance to set aside arbitration awards for failure of the arbitrator to
disclose a relationship with a party." Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 714 F.2d 673, 682 (7th Cir.
1983).
4. The legislature enacted legislation requiring the Judicial Council to create and enact ethics
standards. Cal. Code of Civ. P. §1281.5 states:
Beginning July 1, 2002, a person serving as a neutral arbitrator pursuant to arbitration agreement
shall comply with the ethics standards for arbitrators adopted by the Judicial Council pursuant to
this section. The Judicial Council shall adopt ethical standards for all neutral arbitrators effective
July 1, 2002. These standards shall be consistent with the standards established for arbitrators in
the judicial arbitration program and may expand but may not limit the disclosure and
disqualification requirements established by this chapter. The standards shall address the
disclosure of interests, relationships, or affiliations that may constitute conflicts of interest,
including prior service as an arbitrator or other dispute resolution neutral entity, disqualification,
acceptance of gifts, and establishment of future professional relationships.
5. See supra n. 1.
6. Cal. Code of Civ. P. § 1281.5. Orig. CJC Stand.7(b)(12) became effective January 1,2003.
7. The California Judicial Council is given its authority in the California state constitution. The
CJC is the policymaking body of the California courts. Calif. Const. Art. VI, § 6. Also, the California
court system is the largest state system in the country <http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/presscenter/
newsreleases/NR62-02.HTM> (accessed Mar. 6, 2003). California Supreme Court Chief Justice
George chairs the CJC. Folberg stated:
[George] "appointed a 19 person 'Blue Ribbon Panel of Experts on Arbitration Ethics' to assist
the Council in its task. The panel consisted of professional arbitrators, judges, consumer
1
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that require disclosure in fourteen main matters. 8  The matters range from
disclosure of family and financial relationships with a party 9 to disclosure of the
proposed arbitrator's service as a dispute resolution neutral in a prior case
involving one of the parties.' 0  Jay Folberg, chair of the panel that made
recommendations to the Judicial Council, stated, "[T]he political momentum that
resulted in the mandate to the Judicial Council was the result of public concern
about the proliferation of predispute arbitration clauses in consumer, health care,
and employment contracts."t 1
On December 13, 2002, the CJC approved its first set of changes to the ethics
standards.' 2 Many of the amendments were made to the disclosure requirements.
On December 16, 2002, the CJC issued a press release stating, "The changes are
designed to improve the clarity of the standards and to minimize the burden
associated with compliance while maintaining the appropriate ethical
obligations."' 3 Most of the main body of this Note was written prior to the CJC
changes to the standards. All of the commentary from commentators was in
response to the original standards, which became effective in July 2002.14
Because the changes to the standards were mainly for clarity and not content, the
commentary is still relevant. This Note will quote both the original CJC ethics
standards and the changed standards.'
5
The new rules, which give the Judicial Council greater oversight in arbitration
proceedings, have already received an unwelcome greeting from some arbitrators
and members of the securities industries. Additionally, the New York Stock
Exchange and the National Association for Securities Dealers filed suit against the
CJC in federal court seeking a declaratory judgment that they are exempt from the
ethics standards.16 Yet, many consumers and critics of mandatory arbitrations are
welcoming the rules. In fact, it is likely that other states will begin to welcome
disclosure standards similar to those California has adopted. Complaining
consumers and employees forced into arbitration are likely to lead other state
advocates, a corporate representative, legislative Judicial Committee staff, the legal advisor to the
Governor, and academics ...The panel had no authority other than to advise the drafters,
comment to the Council, and hold public hearings for additional input on initial drafts of the
Standards.... Some of those on the panel supported the creation of arbitration ethics standards
by the Judicial Council, some did not."
Jay Folberg, Arbitration Ethics: Winds of Reform Blowing from the West?, 9 Disp, Resol. Mag. 5,
6 (Fall 2002).
8. Orig. CJC Stand. 7(b).
9. Orig. CJC Stand. 7(1).
10. Orig. CJC Stand. 7(5).
11. Folberg, supra n. 7, at 5. Folberg chaired the panel that made recommendations to the Judicial
Council. Id.
12. Staff Reporters, California Judicial Council Approves Changes to Arbitrator Standards,
ADRWorld.com <http://www.adrworld.com> (Dec. 17, 2002).
13. Judicial Council of California, Judicial Council Honors Courts, Takes Action on New Rules,
Legislation, News Release <http:/www.courtinfo.ca.gov/presscenter/newsreleases/NR92-02.htm>
(Dec. 16, 2002).
14. Although there have been changes, the effective date for the standards remains July 1, 2002.
CJC Stand. 3(a).
15. The original standards will hereinafter be referred to as Orig. CJC Stand. The changed standards
will hereinafter be referred to as CJC Stand.
16. See NASD Dispute Resolution, Inc. v. Judicial Council of Calif., 232 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1064
(N.D. Cal. 2002) (stating that the case should be dismissed because the CJC is immune from being
sued under the Eleventb Amendment to the U.S. Constitution).
2
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legislatures to review the arbitration process. States will probably feel that the
need for unbiased arbitration outweighs the burdens the disclosure requirements
place on arbitrators.
Although the current CJC ethics rules consist of seventeen standards and
several subsections "intended to guide the conduct of arbitrators, '17 this Note will
focus only on the disclosure requirements. The Note will also compare the CJC
standards with disclosure rules that provider organizations have previously
enacted.
II. LEGAL HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
Although the option to arbitrate disputes has been around since the nation's
founding,' 8 courts generally refused to specifically enforce agreements to
arbitrate.' 9 With the passage of the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA")2" of 1925,
Congress legislatively overturned courts' refusals to enforce the agreements.
2 1
The FAA applies to arbitrations where the parties agree to arbitrate their disputes
in a contract. 22 Professor Jean Sternlight stated: "When Congress passed the FAA
in 1925, it intended only to require federal courts to accept arbitration agreements
that had been voluntarily entered into by two parties of relatively equal bargaining
power."
23
In the 1970s, overflowing court dockets prompted courts to allow arbitrations
to replace trials in order to lighten court loads. 24 Over the last two decades,
corporations have included mandatory binding arbitration clauses in agreements
17. CJC Stand. l(a). The standards are: 1. Purpose, intent and construction; 2. Definitions; 3.
Application and effective date; 4. Duration of duty; 5. General duty; 6. Duty to refuse appointment; 7.
Disclosure; 8. Additional disclosures in consumer arbitrations administered by a provider organization;
9. Arbitrators' duty to inform themselves about matters to be disclosed; 10. Disqualification; 11. Duty
to refuse gift, bequest or favor; 12. Duties and limitations regarding future professional relationships or
employment; 13. Conduct of proceeding; 14. Ex parte communication; 15. Confidentiality; 16.
Compensation; 17. Marketing. CJC Stand. 1-17. CJC Stand. 8 and CJC Stand. 9 were added with the
changes the CJC approved on Dec. 13, 2002. However, major portions of the content of the added
standards were mostly taken from Orig. CJC Stand. 7(b)(12) and Orig. CJC Stand. 7(d) and (b)(5).
None of the original standards were deleted. See Orig. CJC Stand. 1-15.
18. Leonard L. Riskin & James E. Westbrook, Dispute Resolution and Lawyers 216 (2d abridged
ed., West 1998) [hereinafter Riskin, Dispute Resolution and Lawyers].
19. Reuben, supra n. 2, at 1019.
20. 9 U.S.C. §§1-16 (2000).
21. Riskin states, "At one time, United States courts would not enforce such an agreement until the
arbitrator had issued the award. This meant parties could withdraw from a proceeding at any time
prior to the award if they thought they were going to lose. Arbitration proponents secured the passage
of federal and state statutes changing the rules." Riskin, supra n. 18, at 218.
22. 9 U.S.C. §§1-16.
23. Jean R. Stemlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's Preference for
Binding Arbitration, 74 Wash. U. L.Q. 637, 641 (1996).
24. Reynolds Holding, Private Justice: Millions are Losing their Legal Rights: Supreme Court
forces disputes from court to arbitration - a system with no laws, San Francisco Chron. (Oct. 7, 2001)
(one article in a newspaper series detailing specific conflicts of interests between parties and arbitrators
in mandatory arbitrations that have caused some consumers to distrust arbitration and highlighting the
views of opponents to mandatory arbitration). Reuben states, "Initially reflecting Chief Justice
Warren Burger's concerns about the case load of the federal courts and the quality of the justice they
dispensed, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a series of opinions over the next decade and one-half that,
in sum, took an expansive and forceful view of the FAA as a reflection of the 'iational policy favoring
arbitration."' Reuben, supra n. 2, at 978.
2003]
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they make with the public and other corporations. 25 In the 1980s and 1990s,
companies began to enter arbitration agreements with consumers and employees,
whereas before arbitration was mostly a phenomenon of business-to-business
26contracts. This is important because previous arbitration agreements were
mostly voluntary and between two businesses.27  Professor Stemlight states,
"Despite consumers' and other little guys' protests that they were unaware they
were signing away their day in court, courts are upholding the clauses on the
ground that Congress has declared arbitration the preferred method of dispute
resolution."28 Additionally, the Supreme Court has spent much of the last two
decades enforcing such clauses.
29
A. Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co. °
Although arbitration has become widespread, the first and only case in which
the Supreme Court addressed arbitrator bias is Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v.
Continental Cas. Co.32  The case arises under the FAA.3 3  In this case, the
"neutral" arbitrator in a tripartite arbitration over a contracting dispute did not
disclose that the prime contractor, who the petitioner was suing, was one of his
regular customers.34  The prime contractor also failed to disclose this
relationship. 35 Although the prime contractor had not patronized the "neutral"
arbitrator for about a year preceding the arbitration proceeding, the contractor and
arbitrator had a "repeated and significant" relationship for four of five years.
36
The relationship included projects involved in the arbitration proceeding. 37 When
25. Holding, supra n. 24.
26. See Stemlight, supra n. 23, at 637-74.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 638-39.
29. See Circuit City Stores Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001) (holding that the FAA applies to all
employees with interstate commerce workers being the only category exempt); Moses H. Cone Meml.
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 941 (1983) (stating that issues concerning arbitration
should be decided in favor of arbitration); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20
(1991) (holding that an age discrimination case must go to arbitration, the Court strayed from its
previous view that civil rights issues were too important for arbitration).
30. Commonwealth, 393 U.S. 145 (1968).
31. Reuben, supra n. 2, at 1059.
32. Commonwealth., 393 U.S. at 145.
33. FAA §10 addresses grounds for vacating an arbitration award, In relevant part, it states:
(a) In any of the following cases the United States court in and for the district wherein the award
was made may make an order vacating the award upon the application of any party to the
arbitration--
(1) where the award was procured by corruption in the arbitrators, or undue means;
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon
sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy;
or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual,
final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.
9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000).
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the arbitration award favored the prime contractor, the petitioner challenged the
award in court.38 The petitioner did not charge that the arbitrator acted
fraudulently or with bias. 39 The only charge was the prime contractor's and the
arbitrator's failure to disclose their business and financial relationship. 40 The trial
and appellate courts refused to set aside the award.4 1 'However, the Supreme
Court reversed the holding in a plurality
42 decision. 43
In a four-judge plurality opinion written by Justice Black, the Court vacated
the arbitration award because of the undisclosed business relationship between the
neutral arbitrator and the prime contractor." The Court compared the arbitrationS45
at issue to a court proceeding. It stated that a court's judgment would be subject
to challenge if a litigant showed that the trier of fact had a relationship similar to
that between the arbitrator and party in Commonwealth which went undisclosed. 6
The Court also compared arbitrators to federal judges.4 7 It quoted a judicial
canon, which stated that a judge should avoid actions that might "reasonably tend
to awaken the suspicion that his social or business relations or friendships
constitute an element in influencing his judicial conduct. 4 8 It used this canon in
conjunction with Rule 18 of the American Arbitration Association's rules, which
requested arbitrators to disclose "circumstances likely to create a presumption of
bias, '49 to find that "any tribunal permitted by law to try cases and controversies
be unbiased but also must avoid even the appearance of bias., 50 The Court added:
we should "be even more scrupulous to safeguard the impartiality of arbitrators
than judges, since the former have completely free rein to decide the law as well
as the facts and are not subject to appellate review.",51 The Court found that the
undisclosed relationship constituted "evident partiality" in violation FAA Section
10.52
Justice White, joined by Justice Marshall, concurred in the plurality's
decision, but made it clear that arbitrators do not have to be held to the same
"standards of judicial decorum of Article III judges," or any other judges. 3 The
justices added that a business relationship between a party and an arbitrator does
not automatically disqualify the arbitrator if both parties to the arbitration are
informed of the relationship before the proceeding, or if the parties are unaware
but the relationship is "trivial."54 The concurring justices further stated that it will
38. Id.
39. Id. at 147.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 146.
42. Justices Black, Warren, Brennan and Douglas constituted the plurality. Justices White and
Marshall concurred. Justices Fortas, Harlan and Stewart dissented. Id. at 145.
43. Id. at 150.
44. Id. at 147.
45. Id. at 148.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 150.
49. Id. at 149.
50. Id. at 150.
51. Id. at 149.
52. Id. at 147.
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not be difficult for courts to distinguish between relationships that are significant
enough to vacate an award and those that are not if arbitrators "err on the side of
disclosure.•
55
In Ceriale v. AMCO Ins. Co.,56 the California Court of Appeals stated that
California courts have adopted the Commonwealth view that arbitrators are
required to "disclose to the parties any dealings that might create an impression of
possible bias.0 7  It also stated that it is unnecessary to vacate everyZ arbitration
award in which the arbitrator and a party's lawyer had some contact. The court
said the issue is "not whether any of these people might actually be biased; the
question is whether 'a person aware of the facts might reasonably entertain a doubt




The Commonwealth plurality opinion emphasized that FAA §10 authorizes an
award to be vacated "where it was 'procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means'
or (w)here there was evident partiality6° . . .in the arbitrators."' The Court used
this language to infer that Congress wanted impartial arbitrations.62 Many state
and federal courts have decided cases challenging arbitration awards on the
existence or nonexistence of evident partiality.63 Theparty challenging the award
has the burden to prove that a reasonable Terson would conclude that ,,the
arbitrator was partial to the opposing party. One commentator states: To
55. Commonwealth., 393 U.S. at 152. In the dissent, Justice Fortas wrote, "I agree that failure of an
arbitrator to volunteer information about business dealings with one party will, prima facie, support a
claim of partiality or bias. But where there is no suggestion that the nondisclosure was calculated, and
where the complaining party disclaims any imputation of partiality, bias, or misconduct, the
presumption clearly is overcome." Id. at 154.
56. 55 Cal. Rptr. 685 (1996).
57. Id. at 688 (quoting Commonwealth., 393 U.S. at 149).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 689 (quoting Betz v. Pankow, 39 Cal, Rptr. 2d 107, 110 n. 3 (1995)).
60. "Read literally, [FAA] section 10(b) would require proof of actual bias (evident partiality)."
Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 714 F.2d 673, 681 (7th Cir. 1983). Additionally, evident partiality
consists of facts that "reasonably create an impression of partiality." Appearance of partiality is
insufficient, and it does not matter whether the partiality is disclosed or undisclosed. Thomas H.
Oehmke, Commercial Arbitration vol. 3, § 145:04 (Rev. ed., West 2002) [hereinafter Oehmke,
Commercial Arbitration].
61. Commonwealth., 393 U.S. at 147 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 10).
62. Id. at 148.
63. See Goldfinger v. Lisker, 500 N.E.2d 857 (N.Y. 1986) (finding evident partiality where an
arbitrator communicated with a party to help the party resolve doubts about the credibility of his
claim); Gianelli Money Purchase Plan & Trust v. ADM Investor Services, Inc., 146 F.3d 1309 (11 th
Cir. 1998) (holding that evident partiality did not exist where there was no actual conflict of interest
and the arbitrator was unaware of information that might cause a reasonable person to believe there
was a conflict of interest); Mantle v. Upper Deck Co., 956 F. Supp. 719 (N.D. Tex. 1997) (refusing to
vacate arbitration award due to arbitrator's failure to disqualify himself where evident partiality did not
exist).
64. Where "actual bias might be present yet impossible to prove ... a man of average probity might
reasonably be suspected of partiality, maybe the language of [FAA] section 10(b) can be stretched to
require disqualification. But the circumstances must be powerfully suggestive of bias..." Merit, 714
F.2d at 681.
65. Oehmke, Commercial Arbitration, supra n. 60, at § 145:04.
6
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vacate an arbitration award on the theory that undisclosed facts evidence an
arbitrator's partiality, the challenging party first must establish that these
undisclosed facts create a reasonable impression of partiality, and then must show
that the arbitrator's alleged partiality is direct, definite, and capable of
demonstration, rather than remote, uncertain, and speculative., 66 In ANR Coal Co.
v. Cogentrix of North Carolina, Inc.,67 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit stated that the courts must examine the following four factors in
determining whether there is evident partiality:
(1) the extent and character of the personal interest, pecuniary or
otherwise, of the arbitrator in the proceeding; (2) the directness of the
relationship between the arbitrator and the party he is alleged to favor;
(3) the connection of that relationship to the arbitration; and (4) the
proximity in time between the relationship and the arbitration
proceeding.
68
Evident partiality is examined on a case-by-case basis, and the burden on the
challenging party is "onerous." 69 Because evident partiality is a high standard,
Judge Posner has stated that the grounds for disqualifying an arbitrator under the
FAA are narrower than both the American Arbitration Association's Code of
Ethics for Arbitrators70 and the disqualification standards to which judges are
held.7'
C. Arbitrators vs. Judges
In addition to discussing evident partiality, Justice Black cited a judicial
canon on impartiality to express his point that arbitrators are to be unbiased.72
However, the Commonwealth concurring opinion was explicit in distinguishing
between judges and arbitrators. 73  In Merit, Judge Posner stated, "The ethical
obligations of arbitrators can be understood only by reference to the fundamental
differences between adjudication by arbitrators and adjudication by judges and
66. Id.
67. 173 F.3d 493 (4th Cir. 1999).
68. Id. at 500.
69. Oehmke, Commercial Arbitration, supra n. 60, at § 145:04 (citing Mantle, 956 F. Supp. at 729).
Before the constitutional issues that are raised when actual or passive arbitrator bias are established can
be introduced, the FAA requirement that "evident partiality" be present must be met. Therefore, courts
may not hear some of the constitutional issues that are raised over an arbitration award. Reuben, supra
n. 2, at 1062.
70. The AAA and the ABA prepared the Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes in
1977 to help maintain high standards and confidence in the arbitration process. See AAA & ABA, The
Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes
<http://www.adr.org/index2.l .jsp?JSPssid=15718&JSPsrc=upload\LIVESITE\
Rules_Procedures\EthicsStandardscode.html> (accessed Mar. 1, 2003).
71. Merit, 714 F.2d at 681. Posner states that just because "failure to disclose was a material
violation of the ethical standards applicable to arbitration proceedings, it does not follow that the
arbitration award may be nullified judicially." Id. at 680. Throughout this opinion, Posner's comments
suggest that vacating an arbitration award is very difficult.
72. Commonwealth., 393 U.S. at 149-50.
73. Id. at 150.
2003]
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jurors .. , The differences exist although "arbitrators are commonly referred to
as private judges. 7 5 Two significant differences between arbitrators and judges
are that parties to arbitration select arbitrators, and arbitrators are generally chosen
because of their expertise in the subject matter of the arbitration.76 Judge Posner
emphasized these points, stating:
Courts are coercive, not voluntary agencies, and the American people's
traditional fear of government oppression has resulted in a judicial
system in which impartiality is prized above expertise. Thus, people who
arbitrate do so because they prefer a tribunal knowledgeable about the
subject matter of their dispute to a generalist court with its austere
impartiality but limited knowledge of subject matter.77
Judge Posner added that parties who choose to arbitrate accept a "tradeoff
between impartiality and expertise." 78 In fact, arbitrators are not required to be
lawyers or judges or have any legal training. 79 However, it is because of these
differences that Justice Black stated, "we should, if anything, be even more
scrupulous to safeguard impartiality of arbitrators than judges, since the former
have completely free rein to decide the law as well as the facts and are not subject
to appellate review." 80
D. Arbitration vs. Litigation
The differences between judges and arbitrators coincide with the differences
between litigation and arbitration. In choosing arbitration over trial, parties
generally waive their rights to be tried according to the requirements of the rules
of evidence and civil procedure. 8' Parties also waive their right to appeal because
most arbitration awards are final. 82 Generally, arbitration's strength is that it is an
informal process.8 3  However, this strength may also be its weakness. Some
concerns over arbitration arise as to "the impartiality of the neutral, equality of
treatment of parties, the ability of the parties to participate in a meaningful way,
the potential for arbitration to exacerbate power imbalances, and the transparency
and rationality of the process itself."' 4  Because "minimal constitutional
74. Merit, 714 F.2d at 679.
75. Stephen K. Huber, The Role of Arbitrator: Conflicts of Interest, 28 Fordham Urb. L.J. 915, 917
(2001).
76. Id.
77. Merit, 714 F.2d at 679.
78. Id.
79. Reuben, supra n. 2, at 965.
80. Commonwealth., 393 U.S. at 149. Cf Edward Brunet, Replacing Folklore Arbitration with a
Contract Model of Arbitration, 74 Tul. L. Rev. 39 (1999) (pointing out that many types of arbitrations
are now more formal than in the earlier days of arbitration).
81. Reuben, supra n. 2, at 1054. "Unlike trial judges, however, arbitrators are generally not bound
by the constraints of substantive law in either the procedures by which they conduct their hearings or
in the standards they use to resolve the dispute, other than any specific instructions that may be
delineated in court-related programs or contractual proceedings." Id. at 965.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1055.
8
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procedural safeguards" are absent in arbitration and other forms of alternative
dispute resloution, arbitration has not yet become a .'safe' environment for binding
dispute resolution .... 85
E. Concerns over Arbitration
Despite potential concerns regarding mandatory arbitration, courts, including
the Supreme Court, 86 routinely enforce arbitration awards. 87 In Moses H. Cone
Meml. Hosp v. Mercury Constr. Corp.,88 the Court discusses enforcing arbitration
agreements. It held that "any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues
should be resolved in favor of arbitration. ... 89 Additionally, the Court stated,
"A further--but less important--reason not to vacate an arbitration award is that the
entire process must be started anew, which is often not the case with courts."
90
Court reluctance to vacate arbitration awards may be due to questions about the
challenging party's motives.9' The concern is that "a challenge to an arbitrator's
independence or impartiality can be no more than a delaying tactic or an improper
attempt to influence the composition of the arbitral tribunal or, later in the process,
a cynical effort to evade the finality of an unfavorable award."
92
Despite courts' reasons for upholding awards, enforcement of arbitration
awards has failed to comfort mandatory arbitration opponents and consumers who
battle against corporations in arbitration.93 One commentator stated, "ADR has
not yet earned its legitimacy as a fair and impartial means of dispute resolution,
either within the bar or with the public at large. 9 4 Several commentators have
found that "voluntary use" of alternative dispute resolution is low and fails to
reach its goal of decreased expenses. 95 Law professors, lawyers, and judges have
expressed discomfort with mandatory arbitration and court reluctance to vacate
awards. Paul Carrington, a professor at Duke University School of Law, has
expressed belief that the Supreme Court "rewrote the statute [FAA] as a service to
corporations that don't like jury trials., 96 Additionally, Montana Supreme Court
Justice Terry Trieweiler stated that court enforcement of arbitration awards
demonstrates "an all too frequent preoccupation on the part of federal judges with
their own caseloads and a total lack of consideration for the rights of
85. Id. at 984.
86. In enforcing arbitration awards, the Supreme Court has comforted itself in "its presumption that
arbitration represents only a change in forum, not a change in substantive rights of the parties."
Reuben, supra n. 2, at 1070 (citing Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26).
87. See infra n. 90 (giving one reason that courts may choose to enforce arbitration awards).
88. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
89. Id. at 24-25.
90. Huber, supra n. 75, at 922.
91. Id.
92. Laurence Shore, Disclosure and Impartiality: An Arbitrator's Responsibility Vis-4-Vis Legal
Standards, 57 Dis. Res. J. 32, 34 (2002).
93. See Holding, supra n. 24. (citing a San Francisco Chronicle article, which discusses some
commentators opposition to mandatory arbitration).
94. Reuben, supra n. 2, at 983-84.
95. Id. at 981 (citing Dr. Deborah Hensler, Address at the Stanford Law School, The Mysteries of
ADR (Stanford Center on Conflict and Negotiation, Feb. 11, 1997)).
96. Holding, supra n. 24. See also Sternlight, supra n. 23, at 644-74 (discussing reasons the
Supreme Court began enforcing mandatory arbitration agreements and awards).
2003]
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individuals. ,97  Generally, the concern is over mandatory arbitration in the
consumer and employment contexts. 98
There is also some concern that parties, known as repeat players, who have
participated in more than one arbitration proceeding will be favored over parties,
known as "one shot" players, who participate in arbitration for the first, and
sometimes only, time.99 Repeat players have several advantages including:
[T]he benefit of experience for purposes of changing how to structure the
next transaction, and the ability to develop expertise, cultivate informal
continuing relationships with institutional incumbents, develop a
reputation and credibility with the neutral, influence rules through
lobbying and other uses of resources, play for precedent and favorable
future rules, and absorb both actual and symbolic defeats. 100
Where repeat players are advantaged, "one shot" players are disadvantaged.
"One shot" players go into arbitration proceedings:
[Hiaving more at stake in a given dispute, being more interested in
immediate rather than long-term gain, being more risk adverse, having
less interest in precedent and favorable rules, being unable to form
continuing relationships with courts or institutional representatives, being
unable to use experience to structure similar transactions, and having less
reliable access to special advocates.'°'
F. California Legislature Takes on Arbitration
In 2001, the California legislature passed and Gov. Gray Davis signed Senate
Bill 475 requiring the California Judicial Council to create and enact ethics
standards for neutral arbitrators. 0 2 The bill was in response to concern that Gov.
Davis, California Supreme Court Chief Justice Ronald M. George, and state
97. Id. Trieweiler also stated, "[m]andatory arbitration allows corporations to undermine the whole
system by which we hold them accountable .... Everyday it becomes more pervasive, and more
oppressive." Id. Further, the final article in San Francisco Chronicle's October 2001 series about
mandatory arbitration emphasizes dissatisfaction with bench decisions enforcing arbitration awards.
The article examines whether judges' interests in being hired as arbitrators influences their rulings
while on the bench. Commentators hold conflicting views. Former Los Angeles Superior Court
judge and current arbitrator Eli Chemow stated that judges who seek arbitration appointments are
"more polite and respectful" because they know that impolite or disrespectful behavior will keep them
from gaining arbitration business. However, Judge Anthony Kline, a California state appellate court
judge, stated that lawyers are understandably "worried about the objectivity of judges who seek
assignments they think will enhance their chance of finding a job as a private arbitrator." Id.
98. See Stemlight, supra n. 23, at 637-712 (discussing the Supreme Court's preference for binding
arbitration, and the evolution of arbitration from business-to-business agreements to business-to-
employee and business-to-consumer mandated agreements).
99. See Reuben, supra n. 2, at 1064-65.
100. Id. (quoting Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves"Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Change, 9 L. & Socy. Rev. 95 (1974)).
101. Id.
102. Cal. Sen. 475 (Sept. 26, 2001). The bill as enacted is Cal. Code of Civ. P. § 1281.5. The bill
"implemented some 'clean-up' reforms for the use of ADR within the judicial system." Folberg, supra
n. 7, at 5.
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Senator Martha Escutia, the bill's author, shared "that the Legislature must take a
serious look at the growing use of private judges and how that growing use raises
questions of fairness and the creation of a dual justice system that favors the
wealthy litigant over the poor litigant." 103 California is the first state to enact such
ethical standards. °4
Despite numerous responses from commentators in favor of and against the
proposed standards, the CJC's "Ethic Standards for Neutral Arbitrators in
Contractual Arbitration" went into effect on July 1, 2002. When the standards
were enacted, the CJC accepted a commentator's recommendations that the
standards be reviewed after a year. 10 5 As stated above, the CJC approved the first
changes to the standards on Dec. 13, 2002. 106
After the original standards were enacted in July 2002, the New York Stock
Exchange ("NYSE") and the National Association for Securities Dealers
("NASD") filed suit in federal court seeking exemption from the standards. 0 7
They sought a declaratory judgment exempting them from following the CJC
ethics standards on the basis that the standards are preempted by federal law.l18
The NYSE and NASD said that the standards required "onerous" disclosure, and
"extensive federal oversight already exists via the Federal Arbitration Act."'°9
However, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed
the suit based on its ruling that the CJC and its individual members are immune
from suit under the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution."1
0
The court opinion stated that the CJC's enactment of the standards was legal
although the policy it enacted is "potentially subject to preemption by, thus
limitation under, federal law. Federal law may prevent particular applications of
the ethical standards, but the creation of those standards was not itself a prohibited
103. Sen. Rules Corn., Off. Of Sen. Floor Analyses, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 475 (2001-2002 Reg.
Sess.)<http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/01-02/bill/sen/sb_0451-
0500/sb 475 cfa 20010906_101400_sen_floor.html> (accessed Apr. 8, 2003).
104. Folberg, supra n. 7, at 5.
105. Cal. Jud. Council Rpt., Summary of Comments 4 (Apr. 9, 2002).
106. See supra n. 12.
107. Loretta Kalb, California's Tough New Rules in Securities Cases Put Arbitration on Hold, The
Sacramento Bee (Sacramento, Cal.) (Aug. 21, 2002). When the CJC standards went into effect the
NYSE and NASD decided to stop all arbitration proceedings in California, forcing parties to leave the
state for arbitration hearings. However, the two securities organizations took heed to then SEC
Chairman Harvey Pitt's written request that the organizations continue arbitration proceedings in
California. Staff Reporters, NYSE, NASD to Comply With SEC Request to Resume Arbitrations,
ADRWorld.com <http://www.adrworld.com/opendocument.asp?Doc=dHNczLnKSa> (last updated
Sept. 11, 2002). Yet, the NASD proposed and the SEC approved a plan in which NASD member
companies would be required to waive the CJC disclosure standards if investors make such a request.
"The new requirement will be in effect for six months or until a federal court in California decides
whether NASD and the NYSE are exempt from the ethics standards, according to the association."
Staff Reporters, SEC Approves Plan to Waive California Code in NASD Arbitrations, ADRWorld.com
<http://www.adrworld.com/opendocument.asp?Doc=V4ii 1 Exq2H> (last updated Oct. 3, 2002).
108. NASD Dispute Resolution, 232 F.Supp.2d at 1055.
109. Id. A federal judge dismissed the case NASD and the NYSE brought against the CJC.
ADRWorld.com reported, "Senior Judge Samuel Conti of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California said the council and its members are entitled to the full immunity from suit
provided by the Eleventh Amendment, throwing out the suit... " Staff Reporters, Judge Dismisses
Case Against California Arbitrator Ethics Rules, ADRWorld.com <http://www.adrworld.com/
opendocument.asp?Doc=91LVDOm2tO> (last updated Nov. 14, 2002).
110. NASD Dispute Resolution, 232 F.Supp.2d at 1066.
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act.""' For this reason, the court stated, cases are typically filed against agents
who enforce the law rather than policymakers who draft the law." 
2
Although the court stated that the CJC and its members may not be sued, it
stated that the standards may be contested in court in another way." 13 It stated,
"[B]ecause the state law depends upon private implementation, Plaintiffs will be
unable to find a government defendant to sue, and will have no choice but to wait
for other parties to assert these argument as defenses against vacatur of an
arbitrator award."' 14 The court also found that the NASD and NYSE had standing
to sue because of their arguments that "they will incur substantial recordkeeping
costs, create conflict with their internal rules, and potentially lose the service of
many of their arbitrators," or "ignore the California standards and risk engaging in
voidable arbitrations." 15 The court stated that these are "concrete" injuries to
satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement for a party to have standing." 6
While the case with the NASD and NYSE was pending, the California
legislature proposed six more bills for arbitration reform.' 7 The governor signed
five of the six bills."18 ADR News Staff Reporters stated:
The consumer arbitration reform bills include:
-AB2656, which would require arbitration providers involved in
consumer arbitrations to collect and publish a range of data, including the
names of non-consumer parties, the arbitrators and their fees, and the
outcome of the case. The bill was amended in the Senate at the request
of the arbitration organizations to provide that no liability would attach
for the information collected and published.
-AB2574, which would prohibit an arbitration provider from
administering a consumer arbitration if it has or had, within the past year,
a financial interest in a party or an attorney for a party, or if the party or
an attorney for a party has or had a financial interest in the arbitration
provider in the preceding year.
-AB2915, which would prohibit an arbitration provider from
administering cases when the arbitration clause contains a "loser pays"
provision, and require an arbitration provider to waive fees for indigent
claimants. The bill was amended in the Senate to clarify that this waiver
would not prevent providers from shifting fees to non-consumer parties.
111. Id. at 1065.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1066.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1062.
116. Id. at 1062-63.
117. Staff Reporters, Veto Urged for Two Bills in California Arbitration Reform Package,
ADRWorld.com <http://www.adrworld.com/opendocument.asp?Doc=xlljv9DvYT> (last updated
Sept. 6, 2002).
118. See Bill Information, <http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/bilinfo.html> (last accessed Oct. 31, 2002)
(AB 3029 was vetoed).
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-AB 3029, which as originally introduced would have prohibited
arbitration providers from administering arbitrations if they provided
consulting, management, or other business services to a party to the
arbitration, or if they solicited ADR business from a party to the
arbitration. The bill was amended substantially by the Senate at the
request of the American Arbitration Association ("AAA"), Judicial
Arbitration and Mediation Services ("JAMS"), and Community Dispute
Resolution Center ("CDRC"), and now would require disclosure of
possible conflicts of interest and provide for the disqualification of an
arbitration provider for failing to comply with the requirements.
-AB3030, which as originally introduced would have limited the civil
immunity of arbitration providers. The bill also was substantially
amended by the Senate to require an ADR provider to forfeit
administrative fees for violating the provisions of the other consumer
arbitration bills.
-AB2504, which would disqualify judges who have discussed serving as
a dispute resolution neutral for a party to [the instant case. It would also]
require arbitrators to disclose any facts that could lead to questions about
their impartiality. 19
HI. COMPARING DISCLOSURE RULES
Several arbitration organizations have adopted ethics guidelines for
arbitrators to follow "regarding ethical issues that may arise during or related to
the arbitration process."' 120  The general purpose of the guidelines is to hold
arbitration proceedings to high standards, and to help ensure confidence in the
arbitration process. 121 Much similarity exists between these purposes and the
CJC's purpose in its ethics standards for neutral arbitrators. The California
standards are "intended to guide the conduct of arbitrators, to inform and protect
participants in arbitration, and to promote public confidence in the arbitration
process. '"122  This section will compare the CJC's arbitrator disclosure
requirements with those of the JAMS,' 23 the National Academy of Arbitrators("NAA"),' 24 and the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act of 2002 ("RUAA").' 25 The
119. Staff Reporters, supra n. 117.
120. JAMS, Ethics Guidelines for Arbitrators <http://www.jamsadr.com/ETHICS-for-arbs.asp> (last
updated Oct. 31, 2002) [hereinafter JAMS Guidelines].
121. AAA & ABA, The Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial
Disputes<http://www.adr.org/index2. I.jsp?JSPssid=1 5718&JSPsrc=upload\LWESITE\RulesProcedu
res'\EthicsStandards~code.html> (last updated Oct. 31, 2002) [hereinafter AAA Code].
122. CJC Stand.I(a).
123. JAMS is a organization that provides arbitrators to parties seeking arbitration. JAMS, Who We
Are <http://jamsadr.com/who we-are.asp> (last accessed Feb. 27, 2003).
124. NAA is an organization that provides arbitrators to parties seeking to settle disputes in
arbitration. NAA <http://www.naarb.org> (last accessed Feb. 27, 2003).
125. Revised Uniform Arbitration Act of 2002 <http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/uarba/
arb00ps.pdf> (last accessed Nov. 11, 2002). "More than two-thirds of the states have enacted statutes,
modeled after the Uniform Arbitration Act, that govern the validity and enforceability of arbitration
agreements. Riskin, supra n. 18, at 3. Although not included in this Note, the five sets of due process
20031
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American Arbitration Association and the American Bar Association joint rules
("AAA standards") will also be compared.126
All five sets of standards discuss disclosure of conflicts of interest, or
information that could reasonably raise questions about impartiality, that are
"known" to arbitrators, 2 7 or of which they are "aware."'128 The standards vary on
whether disclosure "should" occur, or whether it is required to occur. The NAA
states that arbitrators "must" disclose possible conflicts of interests or facts that
raise impartiality questions. Similarly, the RUAA states that arbitrators "shall"
disclose such information. However, it is unclear whether the JAMS and AAA
standards for disclosure are optional or required. JAMS states that arbitrators
"should" disclose. 29  JAMS later adds that disclosure is an "obligation" that
"requires" continuous disclosure. 130  Likewise, AAA repeatedly uses the word
"should" in the first two subsections of its disclosure canon. In its third
subsection, in contrast, AAA states that disclosure is an "obligation" that
"requires" continuous disclosure. 13 1 Like the NAA and RUAA standards, the CJC
makes it clear that arbitrators "must" disclose facts that may reasonably cause
impartiality questions. 13  The CJC, AAA, and RUAA standards all request or
require arbitrators to seek information about relationships or situations that might
reasonably affect their impartiality.' 33 Neither JAMS nor NAA make such a
request. 1
34
protocols for various types of arbitration, including eCommerce and Health Care, include disclosure
requirements for arbitrators. For these due process protocols, see AAA <http://www.adr.org
/index2. I.jsp?JSPssid=15769> (last accessed Feb. 27, 2002).
126. Quantitatively, CJC's disclosure requirements are more lengthy and detailed than any of the
other set of standards discussed. In one of the seven canons, the AAA sets out five subsections about
disclosures arbitrators must make. See AAA Code, Canon 11. In the fifth of its ten standards, JAMS
uses eight subsections to address disclosure and conflicts of interest. See JAMS Guidelines (V). The
NAA and RUAA use five and six main subsections respectively to lay out their disclosure
requirements. See NAA, Code of Professional Responsibility for Arbitrators of Labor-Management
Disputes of the National Academic of Arbitrators, American Arbitration Association and Federal
Mediation and Conciliation Service <http://www.naarb.org/ethics.html#g> (last accessed Oct. 31,
2002) [hereinafter NAA Code]. See also RUAA § 12. However, in the seventh of seventeen standards,
the CJC lays out fourteen subsections to address disclosures neutral arbitrators are required to make.
See CJC Stand. 7(d). Many of CJC's Standard 7's fourteen subsections on disclosure have further
subsections to detail the extent of the required disclosures, and other disclosure requirements are also
listed in Standards 8 and 9. Id.
127. See NAA Code 2(B)(4); RUAA §12(b).
128. See CJC Stand. 7(d); JAMS Guidelines (V)(A). AAA requires arbitrators to "make a reasonable
effort to inform themselves." AAA Code, Canon I1 (B). The AAA rules do not use the language
"known" or "aware." Id.
129. JAMS Guidelines (V)(A), (B), (C) and (D).
130. JAMS Guidelines (V)(D).
131. Id. at (V)(C).
132. CJC Stand. 7(d).
133. AAA Code, Canon II (B) states that arbitrators "should make a reasonable effort to inform
themselves" of relationships and interests that may appear to affect their impartiality. RUAA §12(a)
states that arbitrators are to make a "reasonable inquiry" into facts that might reasonably affect
impartiality. CJC Stand. 9(a) states that arbitrators must "make a reasonable effort to inform himself or
herself of any matters" that might cause reasonable questions of impartiality.
134. See JAMS Guidelines (V); NAA Code 2(B).
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A. Relationship Disclosure
What should, shall, and must "reasonably"' 35 be disclosed varies from one set
of standards to the next. Such variance can be seen in the context of disclosure of
personal and professional relationships. JAMS states that arbitrators should not
"attempt to be secretive" about social or professional relationships, but it adds that
disclosure is unnecessary "unless some feature of a particular relationship might
reasonably appear to impair impartiality."'136  Likewise, the NAA states that
arbitrators must not be "secretive," but it adds that disclosure of personal or
professional relationships is not necessary "unless some feature of a particular
relationship might reasonably appear to impair impartiality." 137 Unlike JAMS, the
NAA explicitly requires disclosure of current or past professional relationships
where the arbitrator is "being considered for an appointment or has been
tentatively designated to serve" with a company or union in the arbitration
proceedings. 38  The NAA standards state, "The duty to disclose includes
membership on a Board of Directors, full-time or part-time service as a
representative or advocate, consultation work for a fee, current stock or bond
ownership (other than mutual fund shares or appropriate trust arrangements), or
any other pertinent form of managerial, financial, or immediate family interest in
the company involved."'139 Such detailed disclosure of professional relationships
is not mentioned in the JAMS standards.
40
AAA states that arbitrators should disclose personal, social, and business
relationships. Disclosure should be made regarding an arbitrator's personal
relationships with a party to the proceeding, a party's lawyer, or a witness.,4,
Arbitrators should also disclose relationships their family members, employers,
business partners, or associates have with a party, a party's lawyer, or a witness.
142
Similarly, the RUAA requires arbitrators to disclose relationships they have with
parties to the proceedings, parties' lawyers, witnesses, and other arbitrators. 143 It
does not state any such requirements for disclosure of relationships that
arbitrators' family members or employers may have with those connected to the
arbitration proceeding. 144 Likewise, neither JAMS nor the NAA suggest that
arbitrators disclose relationships that their family members or employers have
with parties in the arbitration proceeding.
145
The CJC standards are more detailed than any of the above stated standards in
regard to relationship disclosures. The CJC standards are also the most broad.
146
135. All five sets of standards refer to facts that might "reasonably" affect arbitrators' impartiality, or
that a "reasonable" person might consider to affect impartiality. See CJC Stand. 7(d); JAMS
Guidelines (V)(A), (B); NAA Code (B)(3); AAA Code, Canon 11 A(2); RUAA §12 (a).
136. JAMS Guidelines (V)(B).
137. NAA Code 2(B)(3)(a).
138. NAA Code 2(B)(1).
139. NAA Code 2(B)(1)(a).
140. See JAMS Guidelines (V).
141. NAA Code (A)(2).
142. Id.
143. RUAA §12(a)(2). The RUAA disclosure standards were created using the 1977 version of the
AAA/ABA Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes as a primary model. Id. at cmt. 2.
144. RUAA §12(a)(2).
145. See JAMS Guidelines (V); NAA Code 2(B).
146. See CJC Stands. 7, 8 and 9.
20031
15
Patrick: Patrick: New Era of Disclosure
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2003
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 2003, No. 1
The CJC not only requires arbitrators to disclose their familial, personal, and
professional relationships with parties and attorneys in the proceeding, 147 but it
also requires them to disclose personal and professional relationships their
"extended family' ' 148 has or had with people or organizations connected to the
arbitration proceeding. 1
49
Unlike the other sets of standards, CJC specifically requires disclosure of
attorney-client relationships the arbitrator has had with a party's lawyer, officer,
director, trustee, or the party itself within two years preceding the arbitration.
50
Other professional relationships that an arbitrator, or members of the arbitrator's
"immediate family," has had within the two years preceding the arbitration
proceedings must also be disclosed.' 5' Additionally, relationships in which the
arbitrator, or the arbitrator's immediate family, has been an employee of, expert
witness for, or consultant for a party to the arbitration, or a party's lawyer, must be
disclosed. 152 Furthermore, arbitrators must also disclose their associations in the
private practice of law with lawyers in the arbitration proceeding. 153
In regard to consumer arbitration 154 proceedings, arbitrators are required to
disclose relationships between the dispute resolution provider they were selected
through and parties to the proceedings. 155  The standards require disclosure of
"[a]ny significant past, present, or currently expected financial or professional
relationship or affiliation between the dispute resolution provider organization and
a party or lawyer in the arbitration."'' 56  The standards also require nominated
arbitrators to disclose financial relationships and affiliations they have with
provider organizations with the exclusion of case referrals. 1
57
Other than CJC standards, the AAA and NAA standards are the only
standards that attempt to give broad disclosure rules.158  AAA states that
147. CJC Stands. 7(d)(1), (2), (3) and (7).
148. Arbitrators can satisfy the requirement to disclose their extended families' and spouses'
relationships with parties in the arbitration proceeding by declaring in writing that they have sought
information about relationships from their immediate and extended family, as well as members of their
household. CJC Stand. 9(b). This requirement is also satisfied when arbitrators have disclosed "all the
information pertaining to these relationships" within their knowledge. Id. at 7(d)(1).
149. CJC Stand. 9(b).
150. CJC Stand. 7(d)(7).
151. CJC Stand. 7(d)(8).
152. CJC Stand. 7(d)(8)(B) and (C).
153. CJC Stand. 7(d)(8)(A).
154. Consumer arbitration means "an arbitration conducted under a predispute arbitration provision
contained in a contract" that is with a consumer party, was drafted "by or on behalf of the nonconsumer
party," or where "the consumer party was required to accept the arbitration provision in the contract."
CJC Stand. 2(d). "'Consumer arbitration' excludes arbitration proceedings conducted under or arising
out of public sector labor-relations laws, regulations, charter provisions, ordinances, statutes or
agreements." Id. Further, consumer parties includes individuals who seek or acquire, including by
lease, "any goods or services primarily for personal, family, or household purposes including, but not
limited to financial services, insurance, and other goods and services as defined in section 1761 of the
Civil Code." Id. at 7(e)(1). Consumer parties also include individuals with medical malpractice claims
subject to arbitration agreements, employees or applicants for employment in cases arising out of or
relating to employment, those who are healthcare service plan enrollees, subscribers, or insureds. Id. at
7(e)(2),(3) and (4).
155. CJC Stand. 8(b).
156. CJC Stand. 8(b)(1).
157. CJC Stand. 8(c)(1).
158. See AAA Code, Canon 1 (1977); NAA Code 2(B) (2000).
16
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2003, Iss. 1 [2003], Art. 14
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2003/iss1/14
A New Era of Disclosure
arbitrators should disclose "financial, business, professional, family or social
relationships.'' 59 These standards are a distant second to the CJC relationship
disclosure requirements because AAA is not specific about the types of familial
and professional relationships that are to be disclosed. While the NAA does not
give the broad laundry list that AAA gives, its standards go into detail about
disclosure of professional relationships.
160
B. Financial and Personal Interests Disclosure
As with the requirements for relationship disclosures, the five sets of
standards vary on their requirements for disclosure of financial and personal
interests. However, the variations are relatively minute with the exception of the
CJC standards. The AAA standards simply state that potential arbitrators should
disclose "any direct or indirect financial or personal interest in the outcome of the
arbitration. '  Similarly, the RUAA requires disclosure of "financial or personal
interest in the outcome of the arbitration proceeding."' 62 The NAA states that
disclosure must be made of any "pertinent pecuniary interest. ' 63 The variations
among these three sets of standards are very slight.
CJC's standards for disclosing financial and personal interests are not as
simply stated as those in the above three sets of standards. CJC requires
disclosure of financial interests where "the arbitrator or a member of the
arbitrator's immediate family" has a financial interest in a party to the arbitration,
or in the subject matter of the arbitration.I 64  It also requires disclosure in
situations where the arbitration results could substantially affect an interest of the
arbitrator or a member of the arbitrator's immediate family. 165 The CJC standards
do not specifically address disclosure in regard to financial and personal interests
in consumer arbitration. However, they do require arbitrators to disclose financial
relationships and affiliations between the provider organization and a party or
lawyer to the arbitration, and between arbitrator and provider organization.,
66
JAMS does not specifically address disclosure of financial and personal interests.
C. Consequences of Failure to Disclose
All of the standards, with the exception of the NAA standards, state the duty
to disclose begins when the proposed arbitrator is nominated and extends
throughout the course of the arbitration proceedings.167 The comment to CJC
Standard 7 states that arbitrators who fail to disclose within the required time face
the grounds of disqualification, or vacatur of the arbitration award. 168 Under the
159. AAA Code, Canon II (A)(2).
160. NAA Code 2(B)(1).
161. AAA Code, Canon II (A)(1).
162. RUAA § 12(a)(1) (2000).
163. NAA Code 2(B)(1).
164. CJC Stand. 7(d)(9) and (10).
165. CJC Stand. 7(d)(11).
166. CJC Stand. 8.
167. See JAMS Guidelines (V)(D) (2002); RUAA § 12(b) (2000); AAA Code, Canon 1(C); CJC
Stand. 7(f).
168. CJC Stand. 7 cmt.
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RUAA, failure to disclose is grounds for vacating the award the arbitrator gave. 16 9
The RUAA is the only set of standards to state consequences for nondisclosure.
D. Disclosure Requirements Specific Only to the CJC Standards
The CJC disclosure requirements are unique from the other four sets of
disclosure standards discussed in this Note in several ways. As discussed above,
the CJC standards are more detailed than the other standards. The CJC standards
cover almost all, if not all, types of disclosure that the other standards require.
One exception is that the CJC disclosure standards explicitly state that they only
apply to noncollective bargaining cases. 170 Yet, the CJC standards go beyond the
typical disclosures mentioned in the other standards. For example, the CJC
dedicates a standard to disclosures arbitrators must make specifically in consumer
arbitrations.' 7' This standard mainly states requirements that arbitrators must
make about provider organization's relationships and affiliations with parties or
lawyers in the arbitration. 72  It also gives disclosure requirements for
relationships between arbitrators and provider organizations. 173 This is the only
one of the five sets of standards discussed in this Note that requires arbitrators to
make disclosures about the provider organizations' relationships and affiliations.
74
The distinction between consumer arbitrations and other arbitrations is not the
only difference between CJC standards and other standards. The CJC standards
also require proposed arbitrators to disclose their services as a neutral arbitrator, in
a pending, present, or past case within the preceding five years, in a noncollective
bargaining arbitration that involves a party or lawyer to the current arbitration.
75
When more than five cases exist within five years, the arbitrator must give a
summary stating "the total number of cases in which the party to the current
arbitration or the party represented by the lawyer for a party in the current
arbitration was the prevailing party."' 76  These disclosures are in line with
arbitrator disclosure requirements under the California Code of Civil Procedure
Section 1281.9(a)(4).177  Additionally, arbitrators must disclose their services as
compensated dispute resolution neutrals, other than arbitrators, in previous or
169. RUAA § 12(c).
170. CJC Stand. 7(b)(l).
171. CJC Stand. 8.
172. CJC Stand. 8(b)(l).
173. CJC Stand. 8(c).
174. See CJC Stand. 8.
175. CJC Stand. 7(d)(4)(A).
176. CJC Stand. 7(d)(4)(C).
177. Under the CA Civ. Proc. Code Ann. § 1281.9(a)(4) (West 2002), arbitrators must disclose:
The names of the parties to all prior or pending noncollective bargaining cases involving any
party to the arbitration or lawyer for a party for which the proposed neutral arbitrator served or is
serving as neutral arbitrator, and the results of each case arbitrated to conclusion, including the
date of the arbitration award, identification of the prevailing party, the names of the parties'
attorneys and the amount of monetary damages awarded, if any. In order to preserve
confidentiality, it shall be sufficient to give the name of any party not a party to the pending
arbitration as 'claimant' or 'respondent' if the party is an individual and not a business or corporate
entity.
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pending noncollective bargaining cases 178 where a party or lawyer in the current
arbitration is involved, and "the arbitrator . . . expects to receive any form of
compensation for serving in this capacity."' 79  In regard to such cases, the
proposed arbitrators must disclose the parties' names who were involved in each
of the previous or pending cases.18° They must also disclose the name of the
lawyer who is involved, or "whose current associate is involved," in the prior or
pending case in addition to being an attorney in the current arbitration, name
information about their compensation as dispute resolution neutrals, and the
number of cases where they acted as dispute resolution neutrals.1 81 Additionally,
the arbitrators must disclose the type of non-arbitrator dispute resolution neutral in
which they acted. 82 Disclosure is required where "each such case in which the
arbitrator rendered a decision as a temporary judge or referee, the date of the
decision, the prevailing party, the amount of monetary damages awarded, if any,
and the names of the parties' attorneys."083
The CJC requires that an arbitrator disclose personal knowledge, or an
extended family member's personal knowledge, of "disputed evidentiary facts
relevant to the arbitration."' 84 Arbitrators must also disclose their memberships in
organizations that practice "individious discrimination on the basis of race, sex,
religion, national origin, or sexual orientation."'' 85 In a "catchall" subsection, the
CJC standards require an arbitrator to disclose "any matter" that would (a)
reasonably cause questions as to the arbitrator's impartiality from a person aware
of the facts; (b) cause the arbitrator to substantially question his or her own ability
to be impartial, especially due to "bias or prejudice toward a party, lawyer, or law
firm in the arbitration;" or (c) cause the arbitrator to "believe that his or her
disqualification will further the interests of justice."86
The contents of Standard 12 are also unique to the CJC standards. Under this
standard, potential arbitrators have ten days within the service of notice of their
proposed nomination or appointment to make a written disclosure to all parties of
their intentions to "entertain offers of employment or new professional
relationships in any capacity other than as a lawyer, expert witness, or consultant
from a party or a lawyer for a party, including offers to serve as a dispute
resolution neutral in another case." 187  This disclosure, like those stated in
Standards 7 and 8, is a continuing duty.'
88
178. These disclosures must be made for cases where the arbitrator served as another dispute
resolution neutral in cases two years preceding the date of the arbitrator's proposed nomination or
appointed, with the exception of cases concluded before January 1, 2002. CJC Standard 7(d)(5)(A)
(2002).
179. CJC Stand. 7(d)(5).
180. CJC Stand. 7(d)(5)(B)(i).
181. CJC Stand. 7(d)(5)(B)(i).
182. CJC Stand. 7(d)(5)(B)(ii).
183. CJC Stand. 7(d)(5)(B)(iii).
184. CJC Stand. 7(d)(12).
185. CJC Stand. 7(d)(13).
186. CJC Stand. 7(d)(14).
187. CJC Stand. 12(b).
188. CJC Stand. 12(c).
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IV. COMMENT
The CJC Ethics Standards are radical. They set out arbitrator rules that no
other state has stepped out to give.' 89 The issue is whether the size of the step
California took was too big, too small or just right. For the most part, the Judicial
Council's step was just right. However, the new ethics standards do make
arbitrators their "brother's keeper" in many aspects. This section will comment on
whether arbitrators should carry this responsibility. The commentators' remarks
mentioned in this section were made previous to the December 2002 approved
changes for the ethics standards' 90
The CJC was wise to state that its ethics standards establish the "minimum"
requirements for arbitrator disclosure, meaning that the standards set a floor,
rather than a ceiling, for proper disclosure. 91 Prof. Jay Folberg, chair of the
nineteen-member Blue Ribbon Panel that advised the CJC, stated that the panelists
and standard drafters were in agreement that the standards "should be written as
minimum requirements rather than as aspirational goals."'
92
The panel and drafters sought to give the ethics standards the "force of law"
that "standards promulgated by voluntary associations and private entities" do not
have. 19 3 The assertion that the requirements are "minimal" will help consumers
meet the heavy burden of "evident partiality" under the FAA. Because there are
definite things that arbitrators must disclose, arbitrators and prevailing parties will
not be able to assert that the mere appearance of bias is insufficient. They will be
forced to "err on the side of disclosure."'
' 94
Although Standard 7 was enacted, many commentators 195 and some panel
members preferred to err against disclosure on some of the issues the ethics
standards address. Generally, commentators stated that the disclosure
189. "Californians like to think of our state as a trend setter or prototype of what's new and coming
your way. Others may see it as the laboratory for weird and bad ideas." Folberg, supra n. 7 at 8.
190. Comments from commentators were issued in two reports from the Jud. Council of Cal. Admin.
Off. of the Cts. The first report was issued Apr. 9, 2002. <http://www.arbitrationworks.com/
pdfforms/JCCreport.pdf>. The comments in the April report were gathered between Jan. 23 and Feb.
22, 2002. Comments were received from 62 organizations. Cal. Jud. Council Rpt. (Apr. 9, 2002).
However, 63 people are listed in the reports "Key to Commentators" section. id. The second report
was issued Dec. 3, 2002 <http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/rules/reports/documents/mlel3.pdf> (accessed
Apr. 8, 2003). The comments in the December report were gathered between May 16 and Sept. 6,
2002. Comments were received from 41 organizations and individuals. Cal. Jud. Council Rpt. (Dec.
3, 2002).
191. CJC Stand. 1(a).
192. Folberg, supra n. 7, at 6.
193. Id. This assessment is on target with Judge Posner's decision in Merit. Judge Posner stated,
"[a~lthough we have great respect for the Commercial Arbitration Rules and the Code of Ethics for
Arbitrators, they are not the proper starting point for an inquiry into an award's validity under section
10 of the United States Arbitration Act [FAA] and Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The arbitration rules and code do not have the force of law." 714 F.2d at 680.
194. See Commonwealth., 393 U.S. at 152.
195. The Blue Ribbon Panel held public hearings for opinions on drafts of the standards. Folberg,
supra n. 7 at 6. The panel and drafters sought and responded to commentary from 63 commentators.
Cal. Jud. Council Rpt., Ethics Standards for Neutral Arbitrators in Contractual Arbitration (Apr. 9,
2002) <http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/rules/reports/documents/ruleO4.pdf> (accessed Oct. 31, 2002).
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requirements in Standard 7 are "overly long, complex, and burdensome." 196 The
Apr. 9, 2002 report to the standards stated:
These commentators suggested that the standard's [Standard 7] length and
complexity made it difficult to understand, would discourage compliance, and
would create traps for the unwary in the form of late requests for disqualifications
and motions to vacate the arbitrator's award based on inadvertent failures to
comply with these disclosure requirements. Ultimately, these commentators
suggested, this would result in undermining the stability of the arbitration process.
Commentators also suggested that the number and detail of the disclosure
requirements would discourage compliance, result in arbitrators spending too
much time trying to make disclosures, and discourage arbitrators from taking on
small cases. 197
In the report, the CJC staff stated that many commentators objected to
disclosure rules that already existed in statute but were restated in the rules.
98
The standards repeated disclosure requirements set out in California Code of Civil
Procedure Section 1281.9.99 This increased the original Standard 7's length.
However, the staff found it necessary to compile all disclosure requirements in
one place so that parties and arbitrators would not have to search several different
200locations for the requirements. Currently, the disclosure requirements are
spread over Standards 7, 8 and 9.20' Additionally, Standard 12 states a brief
disclosure requirement.2 °2 Despite the commentators' complaints, it was a prudent
move to compile all disclosure requirements in one document. The compilation of
the statutory disclosure requirements and the new standards the CJC adopted into
one document, the CJC's ethics standards, will help prevent arbitrators from
arguing that either the statute or the standards were incomplete. Arbitrators will
not be able to argue that they could not have reasonably known there were more
rules in another location. The compilation of the disclosure rules will prevent
petty arguments in litigation and make it easier for arbitrators to do their jobs.
While some commentators worried about the standards being too
burdensome, others wanted more requirements added. For example, Alan J.
196. Cal. Jud. Council Rpt. at 26 (Apr. 9, 2002).
197. Id. The report directs readers to comments made by Keith Maurer, Assistant General Counsel
for National Arbitration Forum; Hon. Richard P. Byrne, retired judge; Alan L. Cohen, Deputy General
Counsel, Council of Better Business Bureaus, Inc.; Hon. Winslow Christian, retired judge and chair of
the ethics committee for the College of Commercial Arbitrators; Hon. Charles W. Froehlich, retired
judge; Ruth V. Glick, president of the Cal. Dispute Res. Council; Sharon Lybeck Hartmann, an
independent administrator for Kaiser Mandatory System for Disputes with Members; Professor Roger
Haydock, California Western School of Law; Fred Hiestand, General Counsel at Civil Justice Assn. of
Cal.; Bruce E. Meyerson, attorney; Donald S. Sherwyn, of Law Offices of Donald S. Sherwyn; Hon.
Harlan K. Veal, retired judge. Id.
198. Id. at 26-27.
199. CJC Stand. 7, Cmt to Stand. 7.
200. Cal. Jud. Council Rpt. (Apr. 9, 2002), supra n. 13, at 26.
201. See CJC Stands. 7, 8 and 9 (detailing the disclosures prospective arbitrators must make).
202. CJC Stand. 12(b) states, "[iln addition to the disclosures required by standards 7 and 8, within
ten calendar days of service of notice of the proposed nomination or appointment, a proposed arbitrator
must disclose to all the parties in writing, if while that arbitration is pending, he or she will entertain
offers of employment or new professional relationships in any capacity other than as a lawyer, expert
witness, or consultant from a party or lawyer for a party, including offers to serve as a dispute
resolution neutral in another case."
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Mayer 20 3 recommended that the original Standard 7 explicitly state that "former
judges must disclose routine disqualifications under CCP [Cal. Code of Civ. P.]
§170.6" and that a "neutral must reveal prior subject matter competence.
The staff and panel rejected this recommendation stating that the original
Standard 7(b)'s language requiring arbitrators to disclose "any matters that could
cause a person aware of the facts to reasonably entertain a doubt" about the
proposed arbitrator's impartiality would cover Mayer's suggestions if the situation
arose.20 5 Additionally, Nancy Pervini 20 6 felt that disclosure should be required "as
to any fact that may give rise to a doubt," not just for facts that might cause
reasonable entertainment of doubts.20 7  Correctly, the staff rejected this
recommendation. It stated that the original Standard 7(b)(12)208 requires the
"appropriate level of disclosure to consumers. '2°9 Some commentators, such as
Pervini and NYSE General Counsel Richard P. Bernard, made recommendations
that were heavily weighted to favor their industries, constituencies, and clients.2t °
However, whether the commentators wanted deletions or additions, the staff and
panel were fair in addressing commentators' objections to the standards. It seems
as if the staff and panel were able to address commentator concerns objectively
without naively giving in to recommendations from commentators. Some of the
commentator suggestions were adopted, and the standards were amended to
reflect some recommendations.2 ' Continuation of commentary on the new rules
may reflect in further amendments to the standards. Although the staff originally
suggested that the standards be reviewed and subject to amendments after one
212year, the first set of changes have already been approved.
A. Consumer Arbitration Disclosure Regarding Providers
The greatest controversy in drafting the standards was over the original
Standard 7(b)(12), now Standard 8, which pertains to consumer arbitrations. 2 13
203. Mayer is an attorney. Cal. Jud. Council Rpt. (Apr. 9, 2002), Key to Commentators.
204. Id. at Summary of Comments 26 (Apr. 9, 2002).
205. Id. It is important to note that Orig. CJC Stand. 7(b) is almost identical to CJC Stand. 7(d). CJC
Stand. 8 was extracted from Orig. CJC Stand. 7(b)(12).
206. Pervini is the legislative counsel for the Consumer Attorneys of California. Supra n. 203.
207. Supra n. 204.
208. This is now CJC Stand. 8.
209. Id.
210. For example, Pervini's comments advocated broad disclosure in consumer arbitration. Bernard
commented that the disclosure requirements should not apply to the securities industry. See Cal. Jud.
Council Rpt (Apr. 9, 2002), Summary of Comments, 26, 35 (Apr. 9, 2002).
211. For example, Stand. 7(b)(1) formerly required disclosure pertaining to "close personal friends."
Meyerson and Gordon Ownby, General Counsel for Cooperative of American Physicians, Inc.,
objected. The standards language was changed to require disclosures pertaining to "significant
personal relationships." Id. at 27. Additionally, Luella Nelson, of the San Francisco Bar &
Employment Section, suggested that the term "noncollective bargaining cases" should be added to
more sections of the disclosure rules so that it is clearer that the rules only apply to noncollective
bargaining cases. The staff heeded this suggestion. Cal. Jud. Council Rpt. (Dec. 3, 2002), Summary
of Comment 148. The changes were made in the revised CJC standards. See CJC Stand. 7(b)(1).
212. See supra n. 12 (citing an ADRWorld.com article, which states that the CJC approved its first set
of changes to the ethics standards).
213. See Folberg, supra n. 7, at 6 (stating, "[t]he panelists' views diverged most on the topic of
arbitrator disclosure").
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This is the section of the disclosure standard where the CJC went from taking a
step that was just right in size to taking too big of a step. The disclosure
requirements in current CJC Standard 8 are burdensome. This section of the
standards requires arbitrators to make disclosures concerning the provider
organizations that hired the arbitrators. In commenting on the original Standard
7(b)(12), fifteen of the sixty-three commentators argued that:
This is an indirect and improper attempt to regulate providers.
Legislative mandate does not direct attention to provider disclosures.
This standard requires disclosure of matters within the province of
providers, not neutrals. Such regulation should not be attempted
indirectly but should be addressed directly by the legislature.21 4
In response, the staff and panel stated:
"[T]his requirement is within the scope of the authority delegated to the
Judicial Council by Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.85 ...
Existing law already imposes on arbitrators in certain arbitrations the
obligation to disclose information about the administering provider
organization's relationship with the parties and prior service for the
parties; this standard expands" the statutory goal of ensuring a fair
arbitration process.
215
However, the standard's expansion is too wide. Although the standard allows
arbitrators to meet the disclosure requirement by disclosing the Internet address
for matters that might cause reasonable- doubt, 216 arbitrators should not be
burdened with researching the provider organization's history with parties in each
case the arbitrator adjudicates. Folberg stated that the CJC did not have authority
to regulate provider organizations under the "charge" the legislature gave the
CJC. 2 17 However, lack of authority to order provider organizations around does
not justify the CJC ordering arbitrators to search for extra information on the
providers. Providers may become burdened with too many written requests for
conflicts of interest discovery from various arbitrators.
214. Cal. Jud. Council Rpt., Summary of Comments 32 (Apr. 9, 2002).
215. Id.
216. CJC Stand. 8(a)(l) and Orig. CJC Stand. 7(b)(12)(F). "Following some softening modifications,
the council adopted provider-organization disclosures through the medium of the. individual arbitrator."
Folberg, supra n. 7, at 7. Folberg stated:
These modifications included: allowing disclosure by reference to the required information
posted on the provider's web site; limiting provider case information to the prior two years; not
requiring listing of prior cases administered for other lawyers in the appearing lawyer's firm; not
requiring the arbitrator to amend provider related information disclosure as part of the arbitrator's
continuing duty to inform; allowing the arbitrator to rely on information supplied by the provider
organization; delaying the implementation of the required additional disclosures in consumer
cases until January 1, 2003. Folberg, supra n. 7, at 15.
217Folberg, supra n. 7, at 6. "Although much of the criticism of arbitration focused on perceived
conflicts of interests created by arbitration provider organizations, direct regulation of provider
organizations was beyond the Judicial Council's legislative charge. Further, the council does not have
general authority to regulate private organizations." Id.
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Because arbitrators are not allowed to accept appointments without doing
their best to make disclosures, this requirement could significantly slow the
arbitration process down, or cause some arbitrators to lose their appointments to
others. Arbitrators who arbitrate less frequently would lose out to arbitrators who
regularly arbitrate and might have this information already at hand. This could
make it difficult for new arbitrators to gain business.
B. Relationship Disclosures
Perhaps the most obvious "brother's keeper" responsibility that the standards
place on arbitrators is the duty to disclose relationships that the arbitrators' family
members may have with arbitration participants. 21 8 Early drafts of the standards
required disclosure of relationships with "close personal friends."219 This was
changed to "significant personal relationships" after commentators stated that
"close personal friends" was too broad. 220 Attorney Bruce E. Meyerson stated: "A
neutral would have to give relatives a list of players in every arbitration to see if
any are good friends with anyone on the list."221 It seems that Meyerson feared
that arbitrators would be required to be their "brother's keepers." Even with the
change to "significant personal relationships," it is a large burden for arbitrators to
have to disclose relationships other people have with arbitration participants.
However, this burden is necessary for parties to feel that the arbitration
proceeding is fair and impartial. The CJC did lighten the burden in the original
Standard 7(d)(1) and the current CJC Standard 9(b). Current Standard 9 states
that arbitrators can fulfill their duty to inform themselves of potential matters that
must be disclosed concerning relationships that their extended family have, if they
seek the information from immediate family members and extended family
members living in their households.222 They must also declare in writing that they
sought information about the relationships and disclosed all the information they
223have. Arbitrators should understand why parties want this information. Many
businesses and other societal entities are against nepotism and romantic
relationships between co-workers. In essence, these entities fear and have
rebuked bias based on "significant personal relationships" between family
members and significant others. Perhaps the principles behind these rebukes also
apply to arbitration. Although these disclosure requirements may be difficult and
burdensome, they are necessary.
C. Disclosing Previous Arbitration Service
The CJC's requirement that arbitrators disclose their previous service as an
arbitrator in a proceeding involving a participant in the instant arbitration is likely
to help cut down on the repeat player problem. 224 Where the arbitrator has served
218. See CJC Stand. 7 (d)(1),(2) and (3), which is the same as Orig. CJC Stand. 7(b)(1),(2) and (3).
219. Cal. Jud. Council Rpt., Summary of Comments 27 (Apr. 9, 2002).
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. CJC Stand. 9(b)(1).
223. CJC Stand. 9(b)(2).
224. See CJC Stand. 7(d)(4) and Orig. CJC Stand. 7(b)(4).
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as arbitrator in more than five proceedings within the preceding five years, the
arbitrator is required to give the parties to the current arbitration summaries of the
previous arbitration results.225 Parties who receive these summaries will be able to
make more informed decisions about the arbitrator's ability to be impartial. It is
likely that this standard will help members of the general public win more
arbitrations against employers, large corporations, insurance companies, and the
like. This is because the current Standard 7(d)(4) gives one-shot players the
power to stop repeat players from having the advantage of relationships with
repeat arbitrators. The disclosure will give the parties a chance to choose
arbitrators who are not too familiar with either of the parties. Many arbitrators are
likely to be disqualified on this standard alone.226 Thus, arbitrators with prior
connections and more experience may be rejected for less experienced arbitrators
with fewer connections. This could be a good thing for beginning arbitrators, but
it will only hurt them as they gain experience.
D. New Professional Relationships
There was also much objection to the original Standard 10 disclosures, and
these disclosures are now listed in Standard 12. Standard 12 requires that
arbitrators disclose plans to entertain offers for employment or new professional
relationships with a party to the arbitration or a party's lawyer.227 Folberg stated:
"The concern is the appearance of favoritism by booking additional business from
one of the current participants. '228  This concern is fair. A party should be
notified if the arbitrator is negotiating or considering employment or business
offers with another participant in the arbitration. Such a situation creates the
"appearance of bias" that Commonwealth suggests arbitrators avoid.229
Commonwealth states that "arbitrators cannot sever all ties with the business
world. ,230 However, it adds that "we can perceive no way in which the
effectiveness of the arbitration process will be hampered by the simple
requirement that arbitrators disclose to the parties any dealings that might create
an impression of possible bias.
231
225. CJC Stand. 7(d)(4)(C).
226. Commentator Kathryn Page of the Nati. Futures Assoc. stated, "Certain provisions may make it
difficult to find qualified arbitrators, especially when a customer requests a Member panel with futures
industry knowledge, and National Futures Association may have little choice but to move those cases
out of Califomia." Cal. Jud. Council Rpt. (Dec. 3, 2002), Summary of Comment 143. The staff
responded:
The standards require arbitrators to disclose matters that might reasonably raise a question
concerning their impartiality, but leave it to the parties to determine whether to disqualify an
arbitrator based on such disclosures. Staff believes that parties who request a Member panel are
unlikely to disqualify a proposed arbitrator simply because he or she has industry relationships,
but believe these parties should receive the disclosures required by the standards so they can
make an informed decision whether to do so. Id.
227. CJC Stand. 12(b).
228. Folberg, supra n. 7, at 7.
229. Commonwealth., 393 U.S. at 150.
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E. Other Responses and Possible Impact
Those in support of and opposed to California's new ethics standards may be
wondering what impact the CJC standards will have on arbitrations across the
country. The securities industry has expressed that the CJC standards are too
burdensome on industry members. In fact, NYSE General Counsel Bernard
recommended that original CJC Standard 7(b)(12), now Standard 8, regulating
consumer arbitration "exclude already regulated securities exchange arbitrations."
The staff report responded that it would not make that exemption because:
[W]hile the Self-Regulatory Organizations that administer these
arbitration programs are subject to oversight by the Securities and
Exchange Commission, the specific procedures of their dispute
resolution programs, including any applicable ethics requirements, do not
appear to be mandated by statute or government regulation.232
Therefore, it should not be surprising that after the standards were enacted in
July 2002, the NYSE and the NASD filed suit in federal court seeking exemption
from the standards.
233
It seems that the securities industry fears the impact California's standards
will have on other jurisdictions. Robert Clemente234 questioned, "If we allow this
to happen in California, is Arizona going to be next?, 235 Clemente's fears that
other states might create rules similar to the CJC Standards are not unwarranted.
Folberg stated, "The sentiment and concerns prompting these reforms are serious
and not unique to California, they just took root in the California political soil
earlier than elsewhere.' '236  One might infer from Folberg's use of the word
"earlier" that Folberg expects other jurisdictions to follow California's lead and
adopt similar ethics standards. In fact, Folberg predicted that the new standards
might lead provider organization to apply the standards nationwide. He wrote:
"provider organizations may find that once they gear-up to satisfy the California
disclosure requirements, they might as well implement the practices nationwide
232. Cal. Jud. Council Rpt., Summary of Comments 35-36 (Apr. 9, 2002).
233. Kalb, supra n. 107. When the CJC standards went into effect the NYSE and NASD decided to
stop all arbitration proceedings in California, forcing parties to leave the state for arbitration hearings.
However, the two securities organizations took heed to then SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt's written
request that the organizations continue arbitration proceedings in California. Staff Reporters, NYSE,
NASD to Comply With SEC Request to Resume Arbitrations, ADRWorld.com
<http://www.adrworld.com> (last updated Sept. 11, 2002). Yet, the NASD proposed and the SEC
approved a plan in which NASD member companies would be required to waive the CJC disclosure
standards if investors make such a request. "The new requirement will be in effect for six months or
until a federal court in California decides whether NASD and the NYSE are exempt from the ethics
standards, according to the association." Staff Reporters, SEC Approves Plan to Waive California
Code in NASD Arbitrations, ADRWorld.com <http://www.adrworld.com> (last updated Oct. 3, 2002).
See NASD Dispute Resolution, Inc., 232 F. Supp.2d 1055 (This is the citation for the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California's opinion that was issued subsequent to NASD and NYSE
filing suit). See also supra nn. 107-19 (summarizing the federal court opinion in NASD Dispute
Resolution).
234. Clemente is the NYSE's arbitration director in New York. Kalb, supra n. 107.
235. Id.
236. Folberg, supra n. 7, at 8.
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and embrace the changes.' '237 Folberg also predicted that the standards will have a
positive impact on arbitrators' business. He wrote: "The California Standards...
may create more of a market for independent arbitrators, particularly in consumer
cases where the disclosure requirements are most onerous for those affiliated with
a national provider organization. ,238 Folberg might be a little too hopeful. If the
securities industry has any power to influence other jurisdictions not to adopt
similar ethics standards, then it is likely that it will exercise its influence. Then
SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt239 stated: "'the legitimate concerns of individual states
should not threaten a consistent application of rules for a national system."
240
At least two provider organizations have responded to the CJC standards.
Folberg reports: "JAMS ... has enhanced its computerized information tracking
system in order to comply with the California requirements. The [AAA] ... has
indicated that it may not be able to provide to its arbitrators the information that
the standards and new law require for consumer arbitrations." 24' This indicates
that private ADR provider organizations will likely be split over application of
California's new rules. Some, like JAMS, will be willing to work with the new
standards. If these providers restructure and enhance their computer systems, then
it will be easier for the organizations to apply the new standards nationally. It
may become a burden for them to keep a separate computer system exclusively
for California. Therefore, the securities industry may begin to feel pressure
because other private organizations apply standards like those in California.
However, the industry does have hope. It is possible that the standards may be
overturned in suits against private parties in which defendants to the vacatur of an
arbitration award assert that federal law preempts the ethics standards.
242
Since the standards were adopted in April 2002 and enacted in July 2002,
commentators have been voicing their opinion of the impact the standards have
already had. Many commentators suggest that the standards require that only
material disclosures must be made. Louise Al. LaMothe stated, "Since the
standards lack any materiality requirement, they simply give litigants an
opportunity to delay the proceedings or worse, overturn an award. 243  Some
commentators worried that the disclosure standards give losing parties arbitrary
reasons to appeal arbitration awards. M. Scott Donahey244 complained, "There is
no requirement that a violation of the disclosure standards actually prejudice the
237. Id at 9.
238. Id.
239. Pitt resigned his position as SEC Chairman on Nov. 5, 2002. See Patricia Hill, SEC Chief Pitt
Resigns Amid Criticism, PoliticalTurmoil, The Washington Times (Nov. 6, 2002)
<http://www.washtimes.com/national/20021106-21061760.htm > (accessed Nov. 7, 2002).
240. Taking Sides: SEC should favor disclosure in California arbitration spat, 6 Investment News 36
(Sept. 16, 2002).
241. Folberg, supra n. 7, at 8.
242. See NASD Dispute Resolution, 232 F. Supp.2d at 1066 (stating, "[Because the state law
depends upon private implementation, Plaintiffs will be unable to find a government defendant to sue,
and will have no choice but to wait for other parties to assert these arguments as defenses against the
vacatur of an arbitration award.").
243. Cal. Jud. Council Rpt. (Dec. 3, 2002), Summary of Comment 147.
244. Donahey is a partner at Tomlinson Zisko, LLP. <http://www.tzllp.com/attomey.php?id=2>
(accessed Apr. 8, 2003).
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complaining party," Var Fox 245 stated: "The process may be defeated because of
a non-prevailing party's ability to attack the award based upon a failure to disclose
unrelated merits of the case. ' ,2 46 A materiality requirement might be helpful, but it
would not eliminate the problems commentators are worried about. It would
likely be difficult for the CJC to define "materiality" in a non-ambiguous way.
Thus, a materiality requirement will not offer much relief.
Some commentators contend that the standards will have little effect on
arbitrator disclosure. Fox stated: "Although most neutrals will make sure their
credibility is maintained, rules, laws or regulations will not change the thought
process of those who are exceptions." 247 Additionally, the State Bar Committee
on Professional Responsibility and Conduct suggested that the standards be
suspended. It stated: "The standards significantly reduce the finality of
arbitration awards .... The lack of requirement that a technical failure to disclose
affected impartiality of the arbitrator can work a serious injustice on the winning
party.... The Judicial Council should suspend the operation of these standards -
in particular Standards 7 & 10 - and undertake a far more measured examination
of the problems they purport to solve., 248 The CJC Staff responded that it doesn't
believe that it is "appropriate or admissible" for the standards to be suspended.249
It added that the statute requiring the CJC to create the standards mandated that
the standards go into effect on July 1, 2002.250 The CJC accepted commentators'
recommendations that the standards be periodically reviewed.25 1 The standards
have already been amended, and new amendments will likely follow.
F. Changes Already Approved
As stated above, the CJC has approved changes to the ethics standards,
specifically the original Standard 7 on disclosure. In a December 2002 press
release, the CJC stated that it:
[aipproved changes to its ethics standards for neutral arbitrators in
contractual arbitration, in response to recently enacted laws and to public
comments since the standards were adopted earlier this year [2002]. The
changes are designed to improve the clarity of the standards and to
minimize the burden associated with compliance while maintaining
252
appropriate ethical obligations.
245. Fox works for ADR service provider Judicate West. Cal. Jud. Council Rpt., Summary of
Comment, 147 (Dec. 3, 2002).
246. Cal. Jud. Council Rpt. (Dec. 3, 2002), Summary of Comment 147.
247. Id. at 166. Additionally, Hon. Eric E. Younger, of ADR Services, stated, "Escalating disclosure
requirements will result in arbitrations being done by lower-quality people." Id.
248. Id. at 146.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Cal. Jud. Council Rpt., Summary of Comments 37 (Apr. 9, 2002).
252. Judicial Council of California, Judicial Council Honors Courts, Takes Action on New Rules,
Legislation, Press Release <http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/presscenter/newsreleases/NR92-02.HTM>
(Dec. 16, 2002).
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A New Era of Disclosure
In regards to the changes, ADRWorld.com reported that under the changes
there will be "separate conflict-of-interest disclosure requirements for arbitrators
and arbitration service providers in consumer cases, and a duty for arbitrators to
inform themselves about required disclosures."2 53  The article continues,
"California lawmakers earlier this year [2002] approved a slate of bills that
establish new requirements for arbitrators and arbitration service providers in
consumer cases, and the Judicial Council amendments are designed in part to
accommodate those bills.'
2 54
It seems that the CJC wanted to delete some of the redundancies between the
ethics standards and legislation. This is not only apparent by the deletion of the
original Standard 7(b)(12), but, the CJC has also deleted references directing
arbitrators to Cal. Code of Civ.P. Section 1281.5 throughout Standard 7. Instead,
the details are spelled out, and there is less of a need to go to the statute to find out
the necessary information for making disclosures.
For the most part, the changes in Standard 7 and the addition of the two more
standards, Standards 8 and 9, are for clarification purposes. The disclosure
requirements are more detailed, seemingly to eliminate confusion. For example,
Standard 7 now states in its second paragraph that collective bargaining cases are
255
excluded. In the original document, the fact that collective bargaining cases are
excluded from the disclosure requirements was buried in then Standard 7(d)(2).
Additionally, words have been added or deleted for clarification. For example,
the word "compensated" is added to the disclosure requirement for an arbitrator's
previous service as a dispute resolution neutral other than as an arbitrator. 6
Another change worth mentioning is that the disclosure for relationships with
family members is less broad.25 7 "The amendments ...narrow the standard's
definition of family members for purposes of disclosure to only those covered
under state law."
258
The new amendments do not drastically change the original document. It is
likely that those who were pleased with the standards will continue to be pleased
with the amended standards. It is also likely that those who were displeased with
the original standards will continue to be displeased with the amended standards.
V. CONCLUSION
The California Judicial Council's ethics standards for arbitrators are too new
to be sure just what impact they will have on arbitration in California and beyond.
With one lawsuit already filed and dismissed, it is likely that the standards will
253. Supra n. 12.
254. Id.
255. CJC Stand. 7(b)(1).
256. CJC Stand. 7(d)(5).
257. The standards now state, "'Member of the arbitrator's immediate family' means the arbitrator's
spouse or domestic partner and any minor child living in the arbitrator's household." CJC Stand. 2(n).
Previously, the standards stated, "'Member of the arbitrator's immediate family' includes the
arbitrator's spouse or domestic partner (as defined in Family Code § 297) and a minor child living in
the arbitrator's household." CJC Stand. 2(m).
258. Supra n. 12. In the Dec. 3, 2002 report, the CJC staff stated that family members covered in the
original standards were narrowed to cover only the family members that are specified in the Cal. Code
of Civ. Proc. §121.85. Cal. Jud. Council Rpt. (Dec. 3, 2002), Summary of Comment 164.
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make a significant mark on arbitration sooner than later. Although the disclosure
rules will place additional burdens on arbitrators, they seem to detail requirements
that a layperson would consider common sense concerning partiality. Here, the
benefits outweigh the burdens. Yet, the outcry about the burden that the standards
impose on arbitrators will probably continue. However, California is seldom
discouraged by shouts of disapproval from neighbors who almost always jump on
board. Thus, it is likely that other states will begin adopting similar disclosure
rules for arbitrators. While the CJC Standards are likely to be successful in
significantly reducing the amount of biased arbitrations, they probably will not
ensure that all California arbitrations will be unbiased.
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